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The paper studies the dynamic allocation e®ects and intergenerational welfare conse-
quences of environmental taxes. To this end, environmental externalities are introduced
in a Blanchard-Yaari overlapping generations model of a small open economy. A rise in
environmental taxes|taking into account pre-existing distortionary taxes and endoge-
nous labor supply|is shown to yield an e±ciency gain if agents care enough for the
environment. The bene¯ts are unevenly distributed across generations because agents are
heterogeneous in their capital ownership. An accompanying debt policy can be designed|
prescribing debt accumulation at impact and debt redemption in the new steady state|to
ensure everybody gains to the same extent. With lump-sum recycling of environmental
tax revenue, aggregate employment is una®ected in the short run, but falls in the long
run. It raises environmental quality more in the long run than in the short run. Recycling
revenue through a cut in labor taxes, however, is shown to yield a rise in employment in
the short run, which disappears during transition. In the new steady state, environmental
quality is higher at the expense of a lower level of employment.
JEL classi¯cation codes: D60, H23, H63, Q28.
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11 Introduction
Many environmental problems have a cumulative character. Over time a stock of waste
or pollution is built up, damaging the quality of our life-support system now and in the
future. Current decisions on the use of the environment made by short-lived individuals
therefore have long-lasting e®ects. Accordingly, welfare of both present and future generations
is a®ected, that is, there is both an intratemporal and intertemporal external e®ect at work.
Environmental policy should therefore pay attention to both the e±ciency question of `how
much pollution to allow' and the intergenerational equity question of `which generation pays
for the environment and by how much.' Unfortunately, in much of the existing literature
attention has been unduly focused on only the ¯rst aspect, and this paper is aimed to partially
¯ll this void.
Early formal literature analyzing the environment-economy interaction|see Solow (1974)
and Stiglitz (1974), and more recently Thavonen and Kuuluvainen (1991) and Van der Ploeg
and Withagen (1991)|employs an in¯nitely-lived representative agent model, which makes
it hard to study intergenerational issues. Indeed, to the extent that this ¯ctional agent really
constitutes a shortcut description of a dynasty of ¯nitely-lived and altruistically linked gener-
ations, there is no intergenerational external e®ect to worry about.1 In contrast, overlapping
generations (OLG) models, such as developed by Samuelson (1958), Diamond (1965), Yaari
(1965), and Blanchard (1985), allow for a simple demographic structure featuring di®erent
unlinked generations that coexist at any moment in time. In the Yaari-Blanchard framework,
agents face an exogenous probability of death, equal to the birth rate, so as to yield a constant
population size. Unlike the Samuelson and Diamond approach|which assumes household live
for two periods, where a typical period last 35 years|the Blanchard-Yaari model is able to
trace out transition dynamics at business cycle frequencies.
The paper studies both the e±ciency and intergenerational distribution e®ects of envi-
ronmental taxes. To this end, we introduce an ecological sector and endogenous labor supply
in a Yaari-Blanchard model of a small open economy. The model describes four sectors: a
household sector, comprising a large number of cohorts, which di®er with respect to age and
the level and composition of their asset portfolio, a perfectly competitive production sector, a
government sector, and a foreign sector. Households derive utility from environmental quality,
which is modeled as a renewable resource (for example, air or soil quality).2 Environmental
quality is negatively a®ected by pollution, which is generated as a side-product of capital
used in production. Without government intervention, the decentralized market outcome re-
sults in too much pollution because ¯rms fail to internalize its societal cost. Consequently,
the stock of natural resources bequeathed to future generations is degraded. To correct this
1Altruistically linked generations view future generations as continuations of themselves, and therefore
internalize any intergenerational external e®ects.
2Following John and Pecchenino (1994), John and others (1995) and Marini and Scaramozzino (1995), the
environment does not feature as an input into production.
2intergenerational externality, the government employs a capital income tax.
Our modeling framework is related to the work of Marini and Scaramozzino (1995), who
study optimal environmental policy and intergenerational equity utilizing a continuous-time
OLG model.3 But it is most closely connected to the analysis of Bovenberg and Heijdra
(1998), who study pollution taxes in the context of a closed-economy Blanchard-Yaari model,
featuring an exogenously given supply of labor. Bovenberg and Heijdra's model is rather
complex, particularly due to the endogeneity of the rate of interest, necessitating numerical
simulations for much of the welfare analysis. Our ¯rst contribution to the literature is, there-
fore, to develop a much simpler model, which is capable of yielding a full set of analytical
results.4 Indeed, we consider a small open economy, which takes the rate of interest as ¯xed
by world markets. Using the extended Blanchard-Yaari model, we study the intergenera-
tional welfare e®ects of a rise in environmental taxes, assuming the government has access
to lump-sum taxes and transfers to balance its budget. The private welfare e®ects of higher
environmental taxes are shown to be unevenly distributed across generations. Environmental
taxes harm old existing generations, more so the older these generations are. Current genera-
tions born close to the time of the policy change enjoy a welfare gain for low initial taxes, but
future generations lose out. Environmental welfare is the same for all existing generations
(due to the `perpetual youth' assumption), but future generations gain more the later they
are born after the policy change.
Next, we introduce government debt as an additional policy instrument. Public debt and
the environment are related by the joint problem of intergenerational externalities. Accord-
ingly, we design a public debt policy that can redistribute welfare across generations such
that all generations enjoy the same welfare change from environmental taxes. By running a
¯scal de¯cit initially, ¯nanced by issuing public debt, the government can transfer resources
from future to current generations. Future generations, who live in a cleaner world, face
higher lump-sum taxes, which are needed to retire maturing public debt. Such an egalitarian
bond policy can neutralize any intergenerational externalities and generate enough political
support for implementing a (constrained) ¯rst-best pollution tax.
In recent years, there has been a great deal of debate among academics and policy mak-
ers about the interaction between green policies and the tax system. Initiated by the work
of Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994), attention has focused on the so-called double dividend
hypothesis. It says that a green tax reform|that is, using the revenues of an increase in
3Mourmouras (1993), John and Pecchenino (1994) and John and others (1995), and Ono and Maeda (2001)
employ the discrete-time Samuelson-Diamond model, where environmental quality is modelled as a renewable
resource. Work by Howarth (1991), Howarth and Norgaard (1992), and Babu and others (1997) focuses on
exhaustible resources in an intergenerational setting. This literature typically assumes that intergenerational
altruism is absent. A notable exception is Jouvet, Michel and Vidal (2000).
4Our analysis can be seen as complementary to that of Bovenberg and Heijdra (1998). Their analysis
can be interpreted as describing global coordinated environmental policy, whereas our study concerns local
uncoordinated policy.
3environmental taxes to cut distortionary labor taxes in a revenue-neutral fashion|may im-
prove environmental quality and raise employment.5 The idea is that the burden of taxation
is shifted away from social desirable activities such as employment to `public bads' such a
pollution. Although various studies have employed dynamic frameworks, the literature has
paid scant attention to the intergenerational dimension of the issue. By endogenizing the
household's labor supply decision and recognizing pre-existing (distortionary) taxes, we are
able to study the European style double dividend hypothesis and, more generally, intergen-
erational tax incidence issues. We show that, under plausible conditions, a double dividend
materializes in the short run, but not in the long run, re°ecting a fall in employment below
its old steady-state level. The failure of the employment dividend is intimately linked to the
slope of the short-run La®er curve. We furthermore demonstrate that, compared to rebating
revenue lump-sum, the intergenerational welfare distribution is more °attened out.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the model of
overlapping generations for a small open economy. Section 3 analyzes the macroeconomic
e®ects of environmental taxes assuming the government balances its budget via lump-sum
transfers. Section 4 studies the intergenerational welfare e®ects of environmental taxes and
analyzes the role of bond policy as a redistributive devise. Section 5 performs a tax reform
experiment, where the revenues of environmental taxes are recycled via a cut in distortionary
labor taxes. Finally, Section 6 presents some concluding remarks.
2 A Model of Perpetual Youth
2.1 Households
The economy is populated by households facing a constant probability of death, ¸. Households
are born at the same rate, implying a constant population size without migration. For
convenience, the population size has been normalized to unity. The utility functional in




[logX(v;z) + ´ logE(z)]e(½+¸)(t¡z)dz; (1)
where ½ denotes the pure rate of time preference, X(v;t) represents `full consumption', E(t)
stands for the environmental quality, and ´ (¸ 0) denotes the preference weight attached to
the environment. Full consumption depends on goods consumption, C(v;t), and labor supply,
L(v;t), in the following way:








5In the European literature the second dividend concerns a rise in employment, whereas in the American
literature it is more generally de¯ned as the extra bene¯ts derived from the reduction in pre-existing distortions
in the economy. In the following, we focus on the European de¯nition. See Goulder (1995) and Bovenberg
(1997) for comprehensive surveys.
4where µ ¸ 0 represents the intratemporal elasticity of labor supply with respect to the wage
rate. Originating from Greenwood and others (1988), this speci¯cation features the convenient
property that no intertemporal substitution e®ect enters into the household's labor supply
decision.6 The agent's °ow budget restriction is given by:
_ A(v;t) = [r(t) + ¸]A(v;t) + w(t)[1 ¡ ¿L(t)]L(v;t) + Z(t) ¡ C(v;t); (3)
where r(t) denotes the real interest rate, ¿L(t) is a labor income tax, w(t) is the (age-
independent) wage rate, and Z(t) stands for (net) lump-sum government transfers. A dot
above a variable denotes a time derivative, for example, _ A(v;t) ´ dA(v;t)=A(v;t), where
A(v;t) is an individual's ¯nancial wealth. Since we consider a small open economy, the do-
mestic economy is assumed to have a negligible e®ect on world capital markets, giving rise
to the standard no-arbitrage condition, r(t) = r: Apart from interest income, a household's
return on ¯nancial assets includes the return on actuarially fair `reverse life-insurance' con-
tracts.7 Actuarial fairness, or zero pro¯t in the insurance sector, implies that the annuity
payment equals ¸A(v;t).
Maximizing household welfare (1) subject to the °ow budget identity (3) and a transver-
sality condition limz!1 A(v;z)exp[¡
R z
t [r(s) + ¸]ds] = 0 yields expressions for the optimal
time path of full consumption and labor supply:
X(v;t) = (½ + ¸)[A(v;t) + H(v;t)]; (4)
L(t) = [(1 ¡ ¿L(t))w(t)]
µ ; (5)
_ X(v;t)=X(v;t) = r ¡ ®; (6)





where YF(v;t) represents the net present value of disposable `full labor income', where r+¸ is
the individual's risk-of-death adjusted discount rate. Equation (4) shows that full consump-
tion is a constant fraction of total household wealth, which consists of ¯nancial wealth and
human wealth. Financial wealth is composed of government bonds, B(v;t), share holdings,
V (v;t), and net foreign assets, F(v;t), so that A(v;t) ´ B(v;t) + V (v;t) + F(v;t): Equation
(5) says that optimal labor supply is determined by current net wages only and is indepen-
dent of the generation index v.8 Labor supply is exogenous if µ = 0: Full consumption growth
6In view of the extremely tenuous empirical support existing for the intertemporal substitution e®ect (see
Card (1994) for a recent assessment), we prefer to eliminate it from our analysis altogether.
7Without any bequest motive, households conclude a contract with an insurance company paying them an
annuity proportional to their wealth during their life, but requiring a transfer of their entire estate upon death.
8Our approach thus avoids the peculiar outcome that very old (and, in this context, very rich) generations
prefer to consume more leisure than their time endowment allows for, that is, they want to supply a negative
amount of labor.
5equals the di®erence between the exogenous rate of rate of interest and the pure rate of time
preference. Since wages, income taxes and lump-sum transfers are generation independent,
the same holds for full labor income, see (T1.11) in Table 1. This last result implies that
human wealth is the same for all generations as well, that is, H(v;t) = H(t):
Due to the simple demographic structure of the model, aggregate household behavior
follows from integrating over currently alive individual households. Since the fraction of
households born at time v still alive at time t is given by ¸e¸(v¡t), aggregate full consumption,
for example, is given by X(t) ´
R t
¡1 ¸X(v;t)e¸(v¡t)dv. In this spirit, we further de¯ne C(t)
and A(t) as aggregate consumption and aggregate ¯nancial wealth, respectively. Notice that
the aggregates of variables that are age independent are equal to the per-generation variables.
The dynamics of aggregate household behavior can now be summarized by equations (T1.1)
and (T1.2) in Table 1, which we will refer to as the savings system. The ¯rst of these is
the aggregate version of the household's °ow budget constraint (3) and the second follows
from the Euler equation for full consumption (6).9 Note that since the reverse life-insurance
is essentially a transfer from the deceased to the survivors, it plays no role at the aggregate
level.
2.2 Ecology
Pollution is generated as a side-product of physical capital, K(t); used in production. The
°ow of pollution adds to the economy's stock of pollution. Nature, however, is endowed
with a regenerative capacity. Denoting the stock of pollutants by P(t), we can write the
emission equation as _ P(t) = ¡(P(t);K(t)); where @¡=@P < 0 and @¡=@K > 0. The index
of environmental quality featuring in the household's utility function is measured as the
deviation of the stock of pollution from the `virgin value' (P0), E(t) ´ P0 ¡ P(t): Hence,
environmental quality evolves over time according to:
_ E(t) = f(E(t);K(t)); fE < 0;fK < 0; (8)
where ®E ´ ¡fE > 0 represents the regeneration speed of the natural resource and ®K ´
(fK=fE)(K=E) > 0 parameterizes the long-run ecological relationship between `natural' cap-
ital and physical capital. Higher values of ®E imply a faster regeneration speed. In the limit,
as ®E approaches in¯nity, environmental quality behaves more like a °ow variable than a
stock variable. A small value of ®K means that a large reduction in physical capital is needed
in order to engineer a given rise in steady-state environmental quality.
2.3 Firms
The representative ¯rm operates on a perfectly competitive market and produces output net
of depreciation, Y (t); according to a Cobb-Douglas production function, Y (t) = L(t)"K(t)1¡",
9We have also made use of the aggregate version of (2), (4) and (5) to derive (T1.1).
6where 0 < " < 1; and L(t) is aggregate employment. The ¯rm faces convex installation cost,
in the spirit of Uzawa (1969), which renders physical capital less mobile in the short run. The
relationship between net and gross capital accumulation is speci¯ed by:
_ K(t) = [Á(I(t)=K(t)) ¡ ±]K(t); Á0 > 0 > Á00; (9)
where I(t) represents gross investment, ± denotes the rate of depreciation and Á(:) is a con-
cave installation function. The degree of international mobility of physical capital can be
characterized by ¾ ´ ¡(I=K)(Á00=Á0) > 0; where a low value of ¾ characterizes a high de-
gree of capital mobility. Note that the limiting case of ¾ = 0 (that is, no adjustment cost)
corresponds to perfect capital mobility.
The stock market value of the ¯rm equals the net present value of its cash °ow (that is,




[(1 ¡ ¿K(z))(Y (z) ¡ w(z)L(z)) ¡ I(z)]er(t¡z)dz; (10)
where ¿K(t) is a capital income tax. The ¯rm chooses its employment and investment plans
in order to maximize V (t) subject to the accumulation equation, (T1.3), and the production
function, (T1.9). This gives rise to a labor demand function, (T1.6), an investment demand
schedule, (T1.8), and an expression governing the evolution of the shadow value of installed
capital, q(t), (T1.4).10 This last equation in conjunction with the accumulation equation
describes the investment system. Consequently, the value of the ¯rm satis¯es V (t) = q(t)K(t)
(see Hayashi (1982)). By substituting this result in the aggregate version of the household's
asset portfolio, (T1.13) is obtained.
2.4 Government and Foreign Sector
The government levies taxes on labor income and capital income, denoted by ¿L and ¿K;
respectively, so that total revenue T(t) is given by equation (T1.10). Government expenditure
consists of lump-sum transfers to households, Z(t), plus interest payments on its debt. Any
¯scal de¯cit is ¯nanced by issuing bonds and ¯scal surpluses are spent on retiring debt. The
periodic budget identity of the government is given by (T1.15). A No Ponzi Game condition




[T(z) ¡ Z(z)]er(t¡z)dz; (11)
so that outstanding debt (left-hand side of (11)) needs to be covered by the present value of
future primary surpluses (right-hand side of (11)).
10Note that since installation cost are homogeneous of degree zero in I(t) and K(t), and production is
homogeneous of degree one in K(t) and L(t), it is straightforward to show that Tobin's marginal and average
q coincide.
7The goods trade balance (TB(t)) is de¯ned as the di®erence between domestic production
and absorption (that is, C(t) + I(t)):
TB(t) ´ Y (t) ¡ C(t) ¡ I(t): (12)
The current account of the balance of payments results from di®erentiating ¯nancial wealth:
_ F(t) = rF(t) + TB(t): (13)
The change in the net foreign asset position of the country equals interest income from net
foreign assets plus the trade balance.
2.5 Market Equilibrium and Stability
The key equations of the model are gathered in Table 1. Equations (T1.1)-(T1.5) describe
the dynamics of the model, that is, the savings system, (T1.1)-(T1.2), the investment system,
(T1.3)-(T1.4), and the ecological system (T1.5). The static part of the model is represented
by equations (T1.6)-(T1.14). Labor market equilibrium is determined by (T1.6) and (T1.7),
respectively. An increase in the capital stock boosts labor demand. If labor supply is exoge-
nous (µ = 0) the employment e®ect of a higher capital stock vanishes. Investment demand
is represented by (T1.8), the production technology is described by (T1.9), and tax revenue
is given in (T1.10). Equation (T1.11) de¯nes full income, and (T1.12)-(T1.13) relate goods
consumption to full income, full consumption, and transfers. Finally, (T1.14) shows the com-
position of ¯nancial assets, and (T1.15) is the government's budget identity. In all our policy
experiments conducted below, we ensure that government solvency is satis¯ed.
The dynamic part of the model can be reduced to two systems: (i) the savings system,
featuring ¯nancial capital as a predetermined variable and human capital as a forward-looking
variable; and (ii) the investment system, where the physical capital stock is predetermined
and Tobin's q (or the shadow value of capital) is a forward-looking variable. Given that the
interest rate is determined on the world market, the latter is also the only \price variable"
available to clear the capital market. The model is locally saddle-point stable within certain
bounds as summarized by Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 The model is locally saddle-point stable if ½ < r < ½ + ¸. The system can be
decomposed in two systems, featuring the following properties:
(i) the investment system has two distinct characteristic roots, ¡hI < 0, and rI = r+hI > r;
where the stable root satis¯es @hI=@¾ < 0 and hI ! 1 if ¾ ! 0; and
(ii) the savings system has two distinct characteristic roots, ¡hS = r ¡ (½ + ¸) < 0 and
rS = r + ¸ > 0; where the stable root satis¯es @hI=@¸ > 0 and hS ! 1 if ¸ ! 1.
Proof: See Heijdra, Kooiman and Ligthart (2004).
8Table 1. Summary of the Model
_ A(t) = [r ¡ (½ + ¸)]A(t) ¡ (½ + ¸)H(t) + YF(t); (T1.1)
_ H(t) = (r + ¸)H(t) ¡ YF(t); (T1.2)
_ K(t) = [Á(I(t)=K(t)) ¡ ±]K(t); (T1.3)
_ q(t) = [r + ± ¡ Á(I(t)=K(t))]q(t) + I(t)=K(t) ¡ [1 ¡ ¿K(t)](1 ¡ ")(L(t)=K(t))"; (T1.4)
_ E(t) = f(E(t);K(t)); (T1.5)
w(t) = "(L(t)=K(t))"¡1; (T1.6)




Y (t) = L(t)"K(t)1¡"; (T1.9)
T(t) = ¿K(t)[Y (t) ¡ w(t)L(t)] + ¿L(t)w(t)L(t); (T1.10)
YF(t) = (1 + µ)¡1 [w(t)(1 ¡ ¿L(t))]
1+µ + Z(t); (T1.11)
C(t) = X(t) + µ[YF(t) ¡ Z(t)]; (T1.12)
X(t) = (½ + ¸)[A(t) + H(t)]; (T1.13)
A(t) = q(t)K(t) + B(t) + F(t); (T1.14)
_ B(t) = rB(t) + Z(t) ¡ T(t); (T1.15)
The assumption made regarding the world interest rate serves to ensure that agents save
¯nancial wealth (the lower bound, r > ½) and that a steady state exists (the upper bound,
½ + ¸ > r). The latter guarantees the validity of the log-linearization of the model around a
given steady state (see the Appendix Table). Note that the presence of installation cost in the
model results in sluggish adjustment in the capital stock and the emergence of transitional
dynamics.11 The adjustment speed of the investment system and savings system is denoted
by hI and hS; respectively.
3 Dynamic Allocation E®ects of Environmental Taxes
In this section, we study the macroeconomic dynamics of an unanticipated and permanent
increase in an environmentally-motivated capital income tax. We refer to this as an environ-
mental tax, because it acts directly on the source of pollution (that is, capital use), in line
11Without installation costs, deviations from the world interest rate would give rise to an in¯nite rate of






















Figure 1: Dynamics of the Investment System
with Dixit's (1985) `targeting principle.' The labor income tax is held constant at this stage
and bond policy is temporarily abstracted from. Collected tax revenue is returned to house-
holds via lump-sum transfers so as to keep the government budget balanced at each instant of
time.12 The formal proofs underlying the qualitative analysis|obtained by log-linearizing the
model around an initial steady state and subsequently perturbing the system|can be found
in Table 2 and Heijdra, Kooiman and Ligthart (2004). Appendix A.1 sets out the notational
conventions employed throughout.
3.1 Graphical Apparatus
The investment system can be summarized by a simple diagrammatic apparatus (Figure
1). The _ K(t) = 0 locus represents (q;K)-combinations for which the capital stock is in
equilibrium, that is, for which net investment is zero. It is horizontal at q¤; which denotes
the unique value of Tobin's q for which Á(:) = ± (see (T1.3) and (T1.8)). Values of q(t) that
are larger (smaller) than q¤, yield positive (negative) net investment as is indicated by the
horizontal arrows in Figure 1.
The _ q(t) = 0 locus shows (q;K)-combinations for which Tobin's q is constant over time.
It is downward sloping because a higher capital stock leads to a fall in the marginal product
of capital and thus yields lower dividends to share owners. For points to the right (left) of
the _ q(t) = 0 line the marginal product of capital is too low (high), giving rise to capital gains
12Keeping the labor tax constant has the important implication that revenue recycling via net lump-sum
transfers only a®ects the savings system.
10(losses) on investment. Hence, _ q(t) > 0 (< 0) to the left (right) of the line, as has been shown
with vertical arrows in Figure 1. Not surprisingly, in view of the discussion surrounding
Proposition 1, the arrow con¯guration con¯rms that the equilibrium at E0 is saddle point
stable.
The degree of physical capital mobility, as parameterized by ¾, is an important determi-
nant of the transition path of the economy after a shock. Indeed, the lower is ¾, the more
mobile is capital, the more approximate is the saddle path to the _ K(t) = 0 line, and the
higher is the adjustment speed hI. In the limiting case of ¾ ! 0 (that is, perfect mobility),
the saddle path (SP) coincides with _ K(t) = 0 line. In that case, transition to the new steady
state is immediate (hI ! 1), re°ecting that capital is now a jump variable. Accordingly,
Tobin's q is equal to unity, precluding any capital gains or losses.
3.2 Raising Environmental Taxes
The increase in the environmental tax reduces the after-tax marginal product of capital and
thus also lowers Tobin's q, which is the discounted value of present and future marginal
products of capital. To restore the equilibrium value of Tobin's q, the before-tax marginal
product of capital must rise, that is, the capital stock must fall. As a result, the _ q(t) = 0
line shifts to the left. Given that there is no long-run e®ect on Tobin's q, the steady state
shifts from E0 to E1, yielding a lower long-run capital stock. The fall in the steady-state
capital stock is particularly large if labor supply is very elastic (large µ) and the labor share
in production is low (small "). A decrease in the capital stock also reduces the long-run level of
employment, re°ecting the cooperative nature of the two factors of production. Consequently,
wages in the long run fall too, owing to the lower labor productivity. Table 2 summarizes the
impact e®ects (at t = 0 when the policy is implemented) and steady state e®ects (at t ! 1)
on the main economic variables.
Tobin's q jumps down immediately when the policy change is implemented, thereby hurt-
ing capital owners, who experience a drop in ¯nancial wealth. Intuitively, the value of the
installed capital drops, re°ecting the prospect of the after-tax rate of return to capital being
below the ¯xed world interest rate during transition. In terms of Figure 1, the economy
moves from E0 to point A on the saddle path SP1. Capital is not a®ected at impact, explain-
ing why employment, wages, output, and environmental quality do not respond either (see
(A.1)-(A.3) in the Appendix). Full income rises because no reallocations of resources have
taken place yet and the only e®ect is a positive tax rate e®ect, which increases tax revenue
and the concomitant government transfers. Human wealth|de¯ned as the net present value
of the whole future path of full income|displays a jump at impact if initial taxes are low
or the generational turnover e®ect (cf. Heijdra and Ligthart (2000)) is strong or both (see
(T2.8a)).13
13Human capital is likely to rise at impact if generational turnover is much larger than the adjustment speed
11During transition, gross investment collapses while the existing capital stock keeps de-
preciating, causing the capital stock to fall gradually. In terms of Figure 1, the economy
moves along the saddle path from A to E1 according to ~ K(t) = e¡hIt~ q(0) < 0. Capital
losses fall with the height of the adjustment speed of the investment system, owing to a faster
restoration of the after-tax marginal product of capital. The transition paths of employment,
wages, and output mimic that of the capital stock; all variables show a gradual decrease to
their new steady state values. Decumulation of capital decreases the marginal product of
labor, shifting the labor demand curve inward, thereby reducing employment and lowering
wages. Indeed, the full long-run burden of environmental taxes is shifted to labor in a small
open economy.14 Consequently, full income exclusive of transfers falls. Both the reduction in
the capital stock and the induced fall in employment reduce output during transition, which
erodes the tax base so that tax revenue and government transfers also fall. Therefore, full
income inclusive of transfers falls even more than full income exclusive of transfers.15 Not
surprisingly, the transition paths for human and ¯nancial wealth display a pattern similar to
that of full income.16
We saw that at impact there is no e®ect on the environment. During transition, the gradual
fall in the capital stock causes a monotonic increase in environmental quality. In the long
run, environmental quality improves, re°ecting: (i) lower pollution associated with capital
decumulation; and (ii) resource regeneration connected with the fall in the capital stock. If
capital causes a lot of pollution|and thus has a strong impact on ecological regeneration
(that is, ®K large)|a reduction in capital translates into a large increase in environmental
quality. On the other hand, if ®K = 0 capital does not generate any pollution and a reduction
of it does not have any impact on environmental quality (see (T2.9b)).
4 Intergenerational Welfare E®ects of Environmental Taxes
This section studies in what way a rise in the environmental tax a®ects intergenerational
welfare. Again, labor taxes are held constant and bond policy is abstracted from in Sections
4.1-4.2. Throughout, we make use of the additive nature of the households' utility func-
tional (1) by considering separately the changes in non-environmental (or private component
of) welfare (shorthand `P') and environmental welfare (shorthand `E'). Then, we can write:
of the investment system. Intuitively, at a low value of hI (relative to ¸) capital decumulation is sluggish so
that full income falls only slowly, whereas at a high value of ¸ the long run decline in full labor income is
heavily discounted as it shifts past the horizons of the currently living generations. See Heijdra, Kooiman and
Ligthart (2004).
14See also Bovenberg (1993) and Heijdra and Ligthart (2000).
15Equation (T2.6b) shows that full income does not change if: (i) the initial capital income tax is zero
(¿K = 0); and (ii) either labor supply is exogenous (µ = 0) or the labor income tax is zero (¿L).
16Note that the more sluggish the investment system or savings system is, the larger is the ultimate reduction
in ¯nancial wealth.
12dU(v;t) ´ dUP(v;t)+´dUE(t), where ´ is the weight given to the environmental component.
To build some intuition, we ¯rst study the standard case where households are in¯nitely lived
(that is, ¸ = 0) and then move on to the more complex case of ¯nitely-lived households (that
is, ¸ > 0).17
4.1 In¯nitely-Lived Households
If households face a zero probability of death the rate of interest should equal the pure rate
of time preference to guarantee the existence of an initial steady state. Then, perturbing the








where !X denotes the share of full consumption in national income and ~ YF(1) ´ dYF(1)=Y
denotes the income-scaled change in full income in the new steady state. Equation (14)
shows that for a given decline in full income, households are worse o® the faster the economy
approaches its new steady state (a large hI) and the smaller the pure rate of time preference
(½). In the latter case, agents discount future losses more heavily so that any change in full
income has less of an e®ect on life-time utility. If initial labor and environmental tax rates
are zero|so that taxes do no distort agents' decisions|full consumption is una®ected and so
is private welfare. In that case, the increase in environmental taxes has no ¯rst-order e®ects,
because the cost of the fall in the capital stock are exactly o®set by the revenue raised by
environmental taxes. If initial tax rates are positive, however, cost and bene¯ts are equalized
in after-tax terms, implying inequality in pre-tax terms. Agents reduce the stock of capital
more than is socially desirable, because they fail to internalize the e®ect of the erosion of the
tax base on government transfers that supplement their labor earnings.
The environmental component of utility rises, owing to an improvement in environmental












~ K(1) > 0: (15)
A reduction in either hI or ®E results in slower growth of the natural resource and causes
a lower net present value of future environmental bene¯ts. Environmental welfare, however,
increases with ®K, since it ampli¯es the positive environmental e®ect of a given change in the
capital stock.
Whether or not the gain in environmental utility compensates for the loss of private welfare
depends on the parameter setting and the initial (distortionary) tax rates. Except for the case
of zero initial taxes, where the environmental tax does not generate any deadweight losses,
there is no unambiguous answer. With initial taxes positive, we can solve dU(¿K;¿L)=d¿K = 0
17The derivation of the welfare changes can be found in Heijdra, Kooiman and Ligthart (2004).
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¿L; (16)
where an asterisk indicates an `optimal' value. The ¯rst term of (16) being the Pigovian tax
rate and the second term is the tax interaction term (that is, the distortionary e®ect of labor
taxation). The latter drops out if the initial labor income tax rate is zero or labor supply is
perfectly inelastic. Note that (16) is a quasi-reduced form since the right-hand side features
!X, which is a function of initial tax rates. Still we can ¯nd comparative static results for
any model parameter not a®ecting !X, notably the parameters a®ecting the ecological side of
the model. Strong concern for the environment (large ´), a high regeneration speed relative
to the rate of time preference (large ®E and small ½), and a high pollution-generating e®ect
of capital (®K large) all lead to a higher optimal pollution tax.
4.2 Finitely-Lived Households
We now turn to ¯nitely-lived households|and thus study the full, unrestricted model|and
evaluate the welfare consequences of an increase in environmental taxes. Since an agent's
stock of ¯nancial wealth di®ers with his age, environmental taxes a®ect generations' capital
income di®erently. Newborns do not own any ¯nancial wealth yet, and thus a drop in Tobin's
q would not a®ect them. Old existing generations, however, who have accumulated capital
all their life are seriously hurt by the policy change.
As above, we ¯rst discuss the e®ects on private welfare. Because this component of utility
is age dependent, we distinguish between generations that are alive at the time of the policy
change (denoted by t = 0) and those generations that are born after the shock (denoted by
v = t > 0, where the generation index coincides with the historical time index). The path
of welfare change of existing generations at t = 0 as a function of their generation index v is
shown to be
dUP(v;0) = (1 ¡ ®H(v))dUP(¡1;0) + ®H(v)dUP(0;0); v · 0; (17)
a weighted average of the e®ect on an extremely old generation (that is, dUP(¡1;0)) and the
e®ect on a newly-born generation (that is, dUP(0;0)), where the weighing factor, ®H(v) ´
e(r¡½)v; is the share of human wealth in total wealth of an agent belonging to generation v:
A young agent (with v ! 0); consumes out of human wealth only (so that ®H ! 1).









14where !A is the share of (¯nancial) asset income in national income and !H ´ rH=Y denotes
the share of human capital income in national income. Very old agents su®er from the
environmental tax increase, because they primarily consume out of capital income. Whatever
the initial tax rates are, capital owners experience a welfare loss proportional to the capital
loss at impact, ~ A(0) > 0: Young generations' welfare change, however, is proportional to the
change in human wealth at impact, which is positive if initial taxes are low or the generational-
turnover e®ect is strong or both (as was shown in Section 3). Not surprisingly, ¯nancial wealth
does not play a role here, re°ecting that each generation is born without any.
The private welfare consequences for future generations (t ¸ 0) evaluated at birth can
similarly be written as a weighted average of the e®ect on a newly-born generation and on
someone born in the new steady state:








where the weights are determined by the adjustment speed of the investment system. Alter-
natively, the change in non-environmental welfare can also be expressed as being proportional
to the transition path for human wealth (the second part of (19)). As it turns out the expres-
sion for the welfare loss of newborns generalizes to future generations. Financial capital plays
no role, and the reasoning is identical to that for generation zero's welfare change. Note that
generations born in the new steady state unambiguously su®er in the presence of pre-existing
taxes. Intuitively, full income by then has declined and so has human wealth, the determinant
of their welfare.
We now consider the change in environmental welfare in order to explore whether or not
the losses we found for about every generation (except for generations born at time of the
shock) are in some way compensated for by a `green dividend.' The environmental welfare
change for the generation born at time t can be written as a weighted average of the welfare
change of those alive at the time of the shock and those born in the new steady state:
dUE(t) = [1 ¡ a(hI;®E;½ + ¸;t)]dUE(0) + a(hI;®E;½ + ¸;t)dUE(1); (20)
where a(hI;®E;½ + ¸;t) is an adjustment term which is increasing in t and lies between
zero and one.18 The adjustment term represents the part of the evolution of the stock of
natural resources that has been completed at the time of birth of the generation at hand. For




½ + ¸ + hI
¶µ
®E





~ K(1) > 0: (21)
Compared with in¯nite horizons, the modi¯cation introduced by overlapping generations is
that the rate of time preference, ½, is replaced by the risk-of-death adjusted discount rate,
18Further details can be found in Heijdra, Kooiman and Ligthart (2004).
15½+¸. Intuitively, in discounting the future agents take into account the probability that they
are not alive to enjoy a cleaner environment.






~ K(1) > 0: (22)
By the time the new steady-state generations are born, environmental quality is at a higher
level compared to the level for those alive at t = 0.19 The environmental welfare gain rises
with ¡®K=(½ + ¸) for a given decline in the capital stock. It follows immediately from (20)-
(22) that environmental welfare rises monotonically over time so that generations born in the
new steady state enjoy the largest environmental welfare gain. The e®ects are summarized in
Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 A rise in environmental taxes of which the revenue is returned to households
in a lump-sum fashion yields the following welfare changes:
(i) dUP(¡1;0) < 0;
(ii) dUP(0;0) > 0 for low initial tax rates;
(iii) dUP(1;1) · 0;
(iv) dUP(¡1;0) < dUP(0;0) for low initial tax rates;
(v) dUP(1;1) < dUP(0;0) for all initial tax rates; and
(vi) 0 < dUE(0) < dUE(1) for all initial tax rates.
Proof: See Heijdra, Kooiman and Ligthart (2004).20
Environmental welfare rises so that indeed the losses in private welfare are (at least par-
tially) o®set by a green dividend. The extent to which total welfare of each generation rises
depends on the parameter con¯guration, primarily on ´ of course. In sum, the redistributive
e®ects of the environmental tax increase can roughly be characterized as follows. First, if
initial taxes are not too high, the oldest generations are the ones that su®er most. Second,
generations born right after the tax increase are best o® owing to the temporary rise in labor
earnings. Generations born near the new steady state enjoy a welfare gain only for high values
of ´, that is, a strong concern for the environment. In that case, the increase in environmental
quality more than o®sets the drop in their human wealth.
19Note that the two factors|that is,
hI
½+¸+hI < 1 and
®E
½+¸+®E < 1, representing the e®ects of discounting
on the transition path|disappear from (22), leaving the steady-state e®ects only.
20It should be noted that inequality (iv) requires weaker conditions than inequality (ii) since the latter is a
su±cient condition for the former. However, it is not a necessary condition because if (ii) does not hold (iv)
may very well be true.
164.3 Redistributive Bond Policy
The previous sections have shown that environmental taxes generate e±ciency gains, owing
to the internalization of intergenerational pollution externalities. Such a policy, however, re-
distributes welfare away from existing generations toward newly-born generations, generating
non-unanimous political support among generations. Indeed, environmental taxes may even
be obstructed if political decisions are based on majority voting. Accordingly, there is a need
for an accompanying policy instrument to distribute the e±ciency gains more evenly across
generations. Bond policy could serve this purpose as it generates intergenerational ¯scal
externalities. By initially running a ¯scal de¯cit, ¯nanced by issuing long-term government
bonds, the government can make transfer payments to existing generations. Consequently,
future generations, who live in a cleaner world, are confronted with higher lump-sum taxes
necessary to ¯nance debt redemption.
We now introduce government debt in our analysis and show that an egalitarian bond
policy exists that renders the welfare change generation independent:
dU(v;0) = dU(t;t) =
¦
½ + ¸
> 0; (¡v;t > 0); (23)
where ¦ represents the common e±ciency gain resulting from the pollution tax increase cum
public debt policy. We postulate a path of government debt:21
~ B(t) = b0 + b1e¡Á1t + b2e¡Á2t; (24)
so as to yield an outcome as described in (23). The sum of coe±cients, b0 + b1 + b2; param-
eterizes the change in the initial debt stock (that is, ~ B(0)), b0 = ~ B(1) re°ects the long-run
change in government debt, and Ái (with i = f1;2g) determines the adjustment speed.
We determine the appropriate bond policy as follows. Combining (24) and the government
budget identity ((AT.15) in the Appendix Table) yields the path of primary government
de¯cits ~ D(t) ´ ~ Z(t) ¡ ~ T(t) as a function of the parameters Ái and bj; where j = f0;1;2g.
Since the investment system is independent of the path of government debt, full income under










+ ~ D(t); (25)
where the subscript `B' refers to bond policy, `LS' refers to the lump-sum rebating scheme
analyzed in Section 3 and [~ YF(t)]LS is reported in the Appendix (see (A.7)). Intuitively, the
use of bond policy allows us to disentangle the paths of transfers and tax revenue, subject of
course to the government's solvency condition.
The next step is to solve the savings system for ¯nancial and human wealth, both of
which are a®ected by the parameters of the bond path. By confronting the solutions with
21We use the method of undetermined coe±cients to solve for the egalitarian policy. Note that government
solvency is ensured provided Ái ¸ 0 and j bj j¿ 1.
17(23), expressions for the parameters of the bond path (see below) and the e±ciency gain from





















so that the e±ciency gain rises with [~ YF(1)]LS and [ ~ E(1)]LS, both of which are una®ected
by the bond path. Note that ¦ may turn out to be negative|indicating an e±ciency loss|if
the long-run decline in full income dominates the rise in environmental quality. In that case,
initial taxes are already too high.22 The e®ect of [~ YF(1)]LS on ¦ depends on the adjustment
speed of the investment system and the share of full consumption in income. The e®ect of
the rise in [ ~ E(1)]LS on the e±ciency gain is positively a®ected by the regeneration speed of
the renewable resource and the preference weight attached to environmental quality.
Not surprisingly, the e±ciency gain derived above coincides with the gain derived for
the in¯nite horizon case (compare (14)-(15) and (26)). Without initial labor income taxes,
a policy of increasing environmental taxes accompanied by an egalitarian bond policy is
capable of taking the economy to a ¯rst-best outcome. Intuitively, environmental taxes can
be set so as to fully internalize the pollution externality, whereas public transfers address the
intertemporal distortion arising from overlapping generations.
We now characterize the parameters of the bond path. Simultaneously with the tax
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The leading term on the right-hand side of (27) represents the rise in full consumption, and the
second term re°ects the di®erence between the e±ciency gain and the change in environmental
welfare weighted by the ¯nancial wealth share. If ~ B(0) > 0, the government provides a one-o®
subsidy to capital owners in order to compensate them for the capital loss on their assets.























The left hand side of (28) represents the net present value of the steady state change in the
government's interest liabilities. Note the congruence between (27) and (28). The ¯rst term
22Without pre-existing taxes, the gain is unambiguously positive because full income returns to its initial
steady-state value in the long run. See (T2.5b) in Table 2.
23Indeed, inspecting (17)-(18) reveals that egalitarian policy eliminates the generation-speci¯c term in (17),
so that [ ~ A(0)=!A]B must equal [ ~ H(0)=!H]B.
18on the right-hand side of (28) is the fall in long-run human wealth in the absence of bond
policy, and the second term re°ects the di®erence between the e±ciency gain and the change
in environmental welfare expressed in terms of human wealth. Since the environmental gain
materializes only to its full extent in the new steady state, the bond policy intertemporally
reallocates the private cost of this improvement to future generations by retiring debt in the
future, which was built up at the time of the shock. In that way, those who are living in a
cleaner world face higher lump-sum taxes. The three equations above specify the bond path
only partially, a full derivation can be found in Heijdra, Kooiman and Ligthart (2004).24
5 Environmental Taxes Under Labor Tax Recycling
In this section, we consider a green tax reform that consists of an unanticipated and permanent
increase in the environmental tax combined with a reduction in the distortionary labor income
tax. We will call this scenario labor tax recycling. To allow for a comparison with lump-sum
tax recycling, we require the tax reform to be budgetary neutral on impact, but also during
transition. Lump-sum transfers and bond policy are ruled out, implying that the labor tax
is the only tax variable that can be endogenously varied over time to keep the government's
budget balanced. We start with an analysis of a time varying labor income tax rate and derive
conditions on initial tax rates, yielding an equilibrium on the `correct side' of the La®er curve.
Subsequently, we analyze the macroeconomic and distributional consequences of the policy
and compare it with lump-sum rebating.
5.1 Time-Varying Labor Income Taxation
If the government aims to keep its budget balanced at each instant of time, one of the tax
rates needs to vary over time. Intuitively, the tax reform a®ects the base of both taxes during
transition, implying that tax revenue would vary if both tax rates were kept constant after
the implementation of the reform. Without bond policy or lump-sum taxes this contradicts
the presupposed budget neutrality of the tax reform. Accordingly, if environmental taxes are
chosen to be kept constant, we have to allow for a time-varying labor income tax rate. This
apparent analytical complication does not, however, prevent us from solving the model in
almost the same manner as before. The only modi¯cation required is that we ¯rst solve for
the time-varying labor income tax rate as a function of the environmental tax rate and the
capital stock. Subsequently, the result can be plugged into the investment system which can
then be solved as before.
The path of the labor income tax rate that satis¯es the conditions posed is found by
setting ~ B(t) = ~ Z(t) = ~ T(t) = 0 (so that (AT.15) holds trivially) and solving (AT.10) for
24For completeness we state that the adjustment speed parameters are Á1 = hI and Á2 = ®E, which is rather
obvious from the observation that the path of private welfare must smooth the path of environmental welfare
so as to yield an equal welfare change across all generations.
19~ ¿L(t):
"(1 ¡ ¿L)~ ¿L(t) = ¡
h
(1 ¡ ")(1 ¡ ¿K)~ ¿K + !Z ~ Y (t)
i
; (29)
where !Z ´ "¿L + (1 ¡ ")¿K ¸ 0 is the share of tax revenue in national income. The two
terms on the right-hand side of (29) represent the tax rate e®ect and the tax base e®ect,
respectively. In view of the Cobb-Douglas production structure, the tax bases for labor and
capital are both proportional to aggregate output. Of course, if initial taxes are zero, that is,
¿L = ¿K = 0 so that !Z = 0, there is no tax base e®ect to worry about and thus only the
tax rate e®ect remains. If labor supply is exogenous (µ = 0), the labor tax does not a®ect
employment, implying that the short-run tax base e®ect is zero (as capital is predetermined,
~ K(0) = 0) and the long-run tax base e®ect is proportional to the long-run e®ect on the capital
stock (see (A.3)).
Generally, µ > 0 and !Z > 0, so that the tax base e®ect in the impact period is induced
by labor market dynamics only, and by labor and capital reallocation during transition and
in the long run. The implied path for the labor tax can be computed by substituting the
quasi-reduced form for output (A.3) into (29):





(1 + µ)!Z ~ K(t) + [1 + µ(1 ¡ ")](1 ¡ ¿K)~ ¿K
1 ¡ ¿L(1 + µ) + µ(1 ¡ ")(1 ¡ ¿K)
#
: (30)
If initial taxes are zero, the term in square brackets on the right-hand side of (30) is un-
ambiguously positive, so that a rise in the environmental tax yields a fall in the labor tax
rate. As a result, the economy operates on the upward sloping segment of the La®er curve.
Obviously, this result does not extend to all initial tax rates. High initial tax rates may cause
a severe erosion of the labor and capital tax bases such that the economy ends up on the
wrong side of the La®er curve. To ensure an equilibrium on the upward-sloping segment of
the La®er curve, we make a number of assumptions on initial tax rates:
Assumption 1 The initial tax rates ¿K and ¿L satisfy:25
[~ ¿L(0)=~ ¿K < 0] : 1 ¡ ¿L(1 + µ) + µ(1 ¡ ")(1 ¡ ¿K) > 0; (SRL)
[~ ¿L(1)=~ ¿K < 0] : "[1 ¡ ¿L(1 + µ)] ¡ [1 + µ(1 ¡ ")]¿K > 0; (LRL)
implying that the initial tax rates are such that the economy operates on the upward-sloping
segment of the La®er curve in both the short and long run.
25Heijdra, Kooiman and Ligthart (2004) show that there is always a non-trivial region in the south-west of
the feasible tax square where these conditions hold. Speci¯cally, if µ > 0, the region satisfying the short-run
La®er curve condition (SRL) is the triangle de¯ned by (¿L;¿K) = (0;0), (¿L;¿K) = (0;"=(µ(1 ¡ "))), and
(¿L;¿K) = (1=(1 + µ);0). The region satisfying the long-run La®er-curve condition (LRL) is the (smaller)
triangle de¯ned by (¿L;¿K) = (0;0), (¿L;¿K) = (0;"=(1 + µ(1 ¡ "))), and (¿L;¿K) = (1=(1 + µ);0). If µ = 0
SRL, holds for all tax rates.
20Before studying the macroeconomic and distributional consequences of the tax reform,
we must reconsider the stability of the investment system because the reform a®ects its
dynamics. More speci¯cally, the investment system is no longer stable for all levels of initial
taxes. Intuitively, stability requires the after-tax marginal product of capital to rise if the
capital stock falls. By plugging (30) into the quasi-reduced form expression for output in
(A.3), we obtain an expression for the after-tax marginal product of capital:
~ Y (t) ¡ ~ K(t) ¡ ~ ¿K = ¡Ã(¿K;¿L) ~ K(t) ¡ Â(¿K;¿L)~ ¿K; (31)
where the parameters Ã(¿K;¿L) and Â(¿K;¿L) are de¯ned as follows:
Ã(¿K;¿L) ´
"[1 ¡ ¿L(1 + µ)] ¡ µ(1 ¡ ")¿K
1 ¡ ¿L(1 + µ) + µ(1 ¡ ")(1 ¡ ¿K)
;
Â(¿K;¿L) ´
1 ¡ ¿L(1 + µ)
1 ¡ ¿L(1 + µ) + µ(1 ¡ ")(1 ¡ ¿K)
: (32)
The short-run La®er-curve condition (SRL) ensures that the denominator of Ã(¿K;¿L) and
Â(¿K;¿L) is positive. Stability is achieved provided the numerator of Ã(¿K;¿L) is positive
too, yielding the stability condition (SC):
Assumption 2 The initial tax rates ¿K and ¿L satisfy:
[Ã(¿K;¿L) > 0] : "[1 ¡ ¿L(1 + µ)] ¡ µ(1 ¡ ")¿K > 0; (SC)
that is, the initial tax rates are such as to preserve macroeconomic diminishing returns to
capital.
Clearly, this assumption holds if initial tax rates are zero or if labor supply is exogenous.
It furthermore precludes (local) ¯scal increasing returns to capital, which were to exist if the
labor tax cut creates such a large increase in labor supply (and thus employment) that after-
tax capital productivity is increasing in the capital stock. This outcome is clearly unstable.
We have to modify Proposition 1 to yield:
Proposition 3 Suppose that ½ < r < ½+¸, µ > 0, and that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, then
the full model is locally saddle-point stable. The subsystems can be characterized as follows:
(i) the investment system has distinct characteristic roots, ¡hI < ¡h¤
I < 0 and r < r¤
I =
r + h¤
I < rI = r + hI; where the stable root satis¯es @h¤
I=@¾ < 0 and h¤
I ! 1 as ¾ ! 0; and
(ii) the savings system has distinct characteristic roots, ¡hS = r ¡ (½ + ¸) < 0, and
rS = r + ¸ > 0.
Proof: See Appendix A.3.
The dynamic properties of the economy are similar under lump-sum rebating and green
tax reform, but the adjustment speed is the lowest under the latter scenario, that is, hI > h¤
I.
This has important repercussions for both the macroeconomic and distributional e®ects of
the environmental tax.
215.2 Dynamic Allocation E®ects
Figure 1 can be used again to describe the e®ects of a rise in environmental taxes of which
the revenues are used to cut labor taxes. The shift to the left in the _ q(t) line is shown to
be smaller than under lump-sum tax recycling. As a result, the long-run equilibrium is at
E2, the impact e®ect is at A0, and the saddle path is the dashed line from A0 to E2. The
transition path of the capital stock and its associated shadow value is qualitatively similar
to that under lump-sum tax recycling, with the capital stock decreasing gradually to its new
steady-state value and Tobin's q returning to its old equilibrium value upon an initial fall.
Not surprisingly, the qualitative allocation e®ects under labor tax recycling are essentially the
same as those under lump-sum tax recycling, except for the short-run employment e®ect. The
adjustment speed to the new equilibrium is lower, however, and the quantitative allocation
e®ects are di®erent too. All quantitative e®ects are less pronounced under labor tax recycling
because the fall in the capital stock that generates all dynamics is smaller in the labor tax
reform scenario. Table 3 summarizes the e®ects on the main variables and compares them
with the lump-sum tax recycling scenario.
On impact, the shadow value of the capital stock falls, though by less than under lump-
sum recycling, re°ecting a compensating labor supply response. This ensures that the path
of the after-tax marginal product of capital is positioned above the corresponding path for
lump-sum tax recycling, both on impact and during transition.26 Employment rises at impact
due to the labor tax cut, which shifts the labor supply curve down, thereby lowering short-
run wages. The relative size of the impact e®ect on full income under the two scenarios is
ambiguous. It can be shown that [~ YF(0)]LS = [~ YF(0)]LT if labor supply is exogenous (that
is, µ = 0), where `LT' refers to labor tax recycling. But, [~ YF(0)]LS > [~ YF(0)]LT > 0 if labor
supply is endogenous (that is, µ > 0) provided the initial labor tax rate is low.27 Full income
rises at impact due to the labor tax cut, but the increase is smaller than under lump-sum tax
recycling. The reason is that part of the labor tax cut is passed on to capital owners in the
form of lower wages. If initial labor tax rates are high, however, the degree of tax shifting
is lower and the positive e®ect on the after-tax wage rate will start to dominate the rise in
transfers, so that ~ YF(0)]LT > [~ YF(0)]LS.
The fall in the long-run capital stock is smaller if households enjoy a cut in labor taxes
rather than an increase in lump-sum transfers. The increase in labor supply induced by the
fall in the labor tax dampens the reduction in the capital stock required to keep the after-tax
rate of return on capital at its equilibrium value. Accordingly, if labor supply is exogenous,
the two scenarios are equivalent, that is, [ ~ K(1)]LT = [ ~ K(1)]LS = ¡~ ¿K=" < 0: Full income
falls in the long run for the same reasons as under lump-sum tax recycling, but the reduction
26Since Tobin's q represents the present value of this path, its path under tax reform also lies above the
lump-sum path. See Heijdra, Kooiman and Ligthart (2004).
27A necessary and su±cient condition for this result is that ¿L < (1 ¡ ")(1 ¡ ¿K). See Heijdra, Kooiman
and Ligthart (2004).
22is smaller. Compensating labor market adjustments ensure that steady-state labor earnings
exceed the level attained under lump-sum revenue recycling. Evidently, if labor supply is
exogenous the two scenarios coincide, just like if initial taxes are zero, in which case full
income is una®ected.
Is there an employment double dividend? The process of capital decumulation set in mo-
tion by the rise in environmental taxes improves environmental quality without immediately
o®setting the positive employment e®ect. Thus, in the short run, an employment double
dividend is obtained. The environmental gain is persistent and growing, but the employment
dividend is eroded during transition. Intuitively, the decrease in the physical capital stock
depresses labor demand. The concomitant erosion of the tax base necessitates a gradual in-
crease in the labor tax rate, which, in turn, reduces labor supply. Both e®ects result in a
lower level of aggregate employment. At best, if ¿K = 0 initially, the long-run employment
e®ect is zero. Of course, if the short-run La®er-curve condition (SRL) is violated, stability
then requires SC in Assumption 2 to switch sign, so that employment rises in the long run.
At the same time, the steady-state capital stock falls, thereby sustaining a green dividend.
Though theoretically possible, this scenario has little practical value because labor supply
is unlikely to be elastic enough to violate the SRL condition, except for unrealistically high
initial tax rates.
5.3 Distributional E®ects
Now that the dynamic allocation e®ects of the green tax reform have been determined, we
can follow a similar methodology as in Section 4.2 to compute its welfare consequences. It
is shown that the welfare changes across generations are qualitatively similar to those under
lump-sum tax recycling, but the path of welfare change is more °attened out under labor tax
recycling.
The change in ¯nancial wealth follows readily from [ ~ A(0)]LT = !A[~ q(0)]LT < 0. Using
(18), this gives us the change in private welfare of very old generations under labor tax
recycling, [dUP(¡1;0)]LT. Because the fall in Tobin's q is smaller under labor tax recycling,
it immediately follows that old generations experience a smaller welfare loss:
[dUP(¡1;0)]LS < [dUP(¡1;0)]LT < 0: (33)
The welfare e®ect for the generations born in the new steady state, [dUP(1;1)]LT, is derived
in a similar manner as in Section 4.2|using that full income falls by less under labor tax
recycling|so that those generations are hurt too, but by less than under lump-sum tax
recycling:
[dUP(1;1)]LS < [dUP(1;1)]LT · 0: (34)
Using the second expression of (18) and (T2.8a), it immediately follows that generations
born at the time of the implementation of the tax reform bene¯t, but we cannot readily
23compare this with the gain under lump-sum tax recycling. This problem exists because the
impact e®ect on human wealth is a weighted average of the impact and long-run e®ects on
full income, where both the weights di®er (hI > h¤
I) and the quantities to be weighted di®er
(that is, [~ YF(0)]LT < [~ YF(0)]LS for low tax rates and [~ YF(1)]LT > [~ YF(1)]LS otherwise).
No general conclusions can be drawn, but some special cases are nevertheless instructive.
First, if capital is highly mobile (¾ ! 0) then both hI and h¤
I are large relative to ¸, and
the long-run e®ect on full income dominates, so that [ ~ H(0)]LT > [ ~ H(0)]LS. Second, if the
generational-turnover e®ect is strong (¸ is high), the short-run e®ect on full income dominates
so that [ ~ H(0)]LT < [ ~ H(0)]LS for low tax rates. The last inequality also holds generally for
zero initial taxes and thus for initial taxes close to zero.
Substituting the change in the long-run capital stock (see [ ~ K(1)]LT in Table 3) into (21),
and noting that the adjustment speed is h¤
I, we can conclude that the rise in environmental
welfare is smaller under labor tax rebating:
















The smaller drop in the capital stock and the slower adjustment both cause a smaller rise in
environmental welfare in the short run. In the long run, only the capital stock e®ect survives
(see (22), which does not feature hI), ensuring that [dUE(1)]LS > [dUE(1)]LT. Proposition
4 shows that the qualitative e®ects are similar to those of Proposition 2, although the required
conditions are not necessarily similar.
Proposition 4 A rise in environmental taxes of which the revenues are used to cut labor
taxes in a revenue-neutral fashion yields the following changes in welfare across generations:
(i) [dUP(¡1;0)]LT < 0;
(i) [dUP(0;0)]LT > 0 for low initial tax rates;
(iii) [dUP(1;1)]LT < 0;
(iv) [dUP(¡1;0)]LT < [dUP(0;0)]LT for low initial tax rates;
(v) [dUP(1;1)]LT < [dUP(0;0)]LT for all initial tax rates; and
(vi) 0 < [dUE(0)]LT < [dUE(1)]LT for all initial tax rates.
Proof: See Heijdra, Kooiman and Ligthart (2004).
The qualitative welfare results are una®ected by the method of rebating environmental
tax revenue. Of course, for speci¯c generations the consequences of the two policies may
di®er, but the broad picture is by and large the same. The main di®erences between the two
policies are that labor tax recycling: (i) generates slower adjustment to the new steady state
and consequently a®ects more generations; and (ii) yields quantitative allocation e®ects that
are generally smaller. Welfare changes under labor tax rebating are smaller in `amplitude'
but greater in `spread' (that is, the number of generations being a®ected). As a result, old
24generations and generations born in the new steady state enjoy a smaller welfare loss, while
generations born at the time of the policy change gain less. We cannot unambiguously rank
one of the two policies as being preferred. A smaller amplitude is socially desirable, but a
greater spread is not since it generates a larger need for intergenerational redistribution. A
policy maker having to choose between the two policies faces a trade-o® between, on the one
hand, more generations being a®ected, and, on the other hand, the impact being smaller.
Corollary 1 speci¯es the di®erences in welfare e®ects of the two revenue-recycling policies:
Corollary 1 Comparing the welfare changes of a rise in environmental taxes under lump-
sum tax recycling and labor tax recycling yields:
(i) [dUP(¡1;0)]LS < [dUP(¡1;0)]LT for all feasible rates of initial taxes;
(ii) [dUP(0;0)]LS > [dUP(0;0)]LT for low initial tax rates;
(iii) [dUP(1;1)]LS < [dUP(1;1)]LT for all feasible rates of initial taxes;
(iv) [dUE(0)]LS > [dUE(0)]LT; and
(v) [dUE(1)]LS > [dUE(1)]LT for all feasible initial tax rates.
6 Concluding Remarks
The paper has explored the dynamic allocation e®ects and intergenerational welfare impli-
cations of a balanced budget rise in environmental taxes. Consider ¯rst the case where tax
revenues are returned to households in a lump-sum fashion. Environmental taxes are shown
to have negative e®ects on physical capital accumulation and aggregate employment in the
new steady state, thereby improving long-run environmental quality. Since capital is the only
pollution-producing factor, it is optimal to tax capital income directly, despite that labor is
ultimately bearing the incidence of the environmental tax.
By internalizing pollution externalities, environmental taxes enhance economic e±ciency,
but yield uneven e®ects on the intergenerational distribution of income and welfare. In
particular, old generations su®er losses in private welfare, owing to a fall in capital income,
whereas young generations|primarily consuming out of human capital|experience smaller
welfare losses. In fact, their private welfare may even rise if they are born close to the time
of implementation of the policy change and initial taxes are not too high. Future generations
enjoy a rise in environmental welfare from a larger stock of natural capital, but su®er a
private welfare loss on account of the smaller stock of physical capital they have to work
with. Generations born further into the future experience the largest environmental welfare
gain, because they are born in the cleanest world. Accordingly, without further supporting
transfers, environmental taxes may be political hard to implement as current generations are
the ones that vote on new policies.
Policy makers can employ bond policy to neutralize the uneven welfare e®ects of environ-
mental taxes. By initially running a ¯scal de¯cit, ¯nanced by issuing bonds, the government
25can provide lump-sum transfers to existing generations to compensate for their private welfare
losses. Generations born after the policy change|which are living in the cleanest world, and
thus are better o® in terms of environmental welfare|bear the burden of debt redemption.
In that way, all generations enjoy the same welfare gain from environmental taxes.
Rebating environmental tax revenue in the form of a cut in labor income taxes|assuming
the economy operates on the upward-sloping segment of the La®er curve|yields a rise in
employment in the short run, re°ecting the positive labor supply response induced by the
fall in labor taxes. In the long run, employment falls, however, but by less than under lump-
sum tax recycling, implying that the employment double dividend is a short-run phenomenon
in an open economy. Compared to lump-sum rebating the distribution of welfare changes
across generations is °attened out more. Accordingly, old existing generations and future
generations lose out less, whereas generations born at the time of the shock gain less.
The paper could be usefully extended in a number of directions. First, environmental
quality was modeled to enter the household's utility function in a separable fashion, though
widely accepted as a convenient simpli¯cation, it is rather restrictive. More general speci¯ca-
tions of the utility function can take into account interaction e®ects: a cleaner environment
may encourage households to consume more leisure. Furthermore, the interaction between
the environment and the production side of the economy could be °eshed out more. Including
the renewable resource as an input into production is a fruitful extension.28
Appendix
A.1 Log-linearized Model
To solve the model we log-linearize the equations of Table 1 (in the main text) around an
initial steady state, where B = F = 0 holds initially. The linearization is based on the
standard de¯nition, that is, ~ x(t) ´ dx(t)=x for most of the variables, except for: (i) time
derivatives, which are scaled by the steady-state level of a variable rather than the steady-
state change since the latter is generally zero, for example, _ ~ x(t) ´ _ x(t)=x; (ii) ¯nancial assets
and human capital (that is, A(t), B(t); F(t); and H(t)), which are scaled by output and
multiplied by r, for example, ~ A(t) ´ rdA(t)=Y , and YF(t), T(t) and Z(t); which are scaled
by output, for example, ~ YF(t) ´ dYF(t)=Y ; and (iii) income tax rates, which are de¯ned as
~ ¿j(t) ´ d¿j(t)=(1 ¡ ¿j), where j = fK;Lg. We further use shares !C, !X, !I and !A which
are all de¯ned as the ratio of the respective variable over net output, except for the share of
¯nancial wealth which is pre-multiplied by r. The results of the linearization are reported in
the Appendix Table.
By using (AT.6), (AT.7), and (AT.9), we obtain `quasi-reduced form' expressions for
employment, ~ L(t), the wage rate, ~ w(t), and aggregate net output, ~ Y (t) as functions of the
28Mourmouras (1993) includes natural resources as an input to production in a Diamond OLG model. He





(1 ¡ ") ~ K(t) ¡ ~ ¿L(t)
i
1 + µ(1 ¡ ")
; (A.1)
~ w(t) =
(1 ¡ ") ~ K(t) + µ(1 ¡ ")~ ¿L(t)
1 + µ(1 ¡ ")
; (A.2)
~ Y (t) =
(1 + µ)(1 ¡ ") ~ K(t) ¡ "µ~ ¿L(t)
1 + µ(1 ¡ ")
: (A.3)
A.2 Environmental Taxes Under Lump-Sum Tax Recycling
The stability of the investment system is investigated by using (AT.15) and (AT.8) in (AT.3)-
(AT.4) and writing the resulting expressions in matrix format:





























where the Jacobian matrix on the right-hand side has the characteristic polynomial:









1 + (1 ¡ ")µ
¶
; (A.5)
which has distinct roots ¡hI < 0 and rI = r + hI > r. This shows that the investment
system is stable if labor income taxes are exogenously given, as in Sections 3 and 4 of the









that is, the adjustment speed is negatively related to ¾:
In a similar fashion, the stability of the savings system can be shown by writing (AT.1)-
(AT.2) in the matrix form:





r + ¸ 0











where ~ YF(t) is the time-varying shock term of the savings system, that is, the shock in full
income given in (AT.11). The savings system has the following characteristic polynomial:
pS(x) = (r ¡ (½ + ¸) ¡ x)(r + ¸ ¡ x);
which has distinct roots ¡hS = r ¡ (½ + ¸) < 0 and rS = r + ¸ > 0. Hence, the savings
system is also stable. Proposition 1 in the main text summarizes the results.
27Equation system (A.4) can be solved in steady state to arrive at expressions for ~ K(1)
and ~ q(1). Using (A.1)-(A.3) and the equations in the Appendix Table, expressions for the
other variables can be derived. Table 2 in the main text summarizes the results. As further
explained in Heijdra, Kooiman and Ligthart (2004), we can now also derive transition paths.
For example, the path for full consumption is a weighted average of the impact and the
steady-state e®ect:





A.3 Environmental Taxes Under Labor Tax Recycling
Under labor tax recycling, (31), (AT.3), (AT.4), and (AT.8) are combined to obtain the matrix
expression for the investment system:























where Ã(¿L;¿K) and Â(¿L;¿K) are given in (32) in the main text. Stability holds provided the
determinant of the Jacobian matrix on the right-hand side is negative, that is Ã(¿L;¿K) > 0:
The SRL condition in Assumption 1 ensures that the denominator of Ã(¿L;¿K) is positive,
so that the stability condition is met provided Assumption 2 holds (and thus the numerator
of Ã(¿L;¿K) is positive also).
The inequality h¤
I < hI is proved by noting that the characteristic polynomial associated
with the Jacobian matrix on the right-hand side of (A.7) is:
p¤













It is straightforward to show that, provided µ!Z > 0, p¤
I(x) is a vertical shift down from
pI(x), that is, the term in square brackets on the right-hand side of (A.9) is positive. This
proves that r¤
I < rI and h¤
I < hI.
As the shock term of the savings system, ~ YF(t), is time varying, standard comparative
static analysis does not deliver a solution for the transition. Instead, we apply the Laplace
transform method pioneered by Judd (1982, 1985) and developed by, among others, Bovenberg
(1993).29






which can be interpreted as the net present value of the path of x(t) discounted at rate s.
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31Appendix Table. Log-Linearized Model
_ ~ A(t) = [r ¡ (½ + ¸)] ~ A(t) ¡ (½ + ¸) ~ H(t) + r~ YF(t) (AT.1)
_ ~ H(t) = (r + ¸) ~ H(t) ¡ r~ YF(t) (AT.2)
_ ~ K(t) = (r!I=!A)
h
~ I(t) ¡ ~ K(t)
i
(AT.3)
_ ~ q(t) = r~ q(t) ¡ [r(!A + !I)=!A]
h
~ Y (t) ¡ ~ K(t) ¡ ~ ¿K(t)
i
(AT.4)
_ ~ E(t) = ¡®E
h
~ E(t) + ®K ~ K(t)
i
(AT.5)
~ w(t) = ~ Y (t) ¡ ~ L(t) (AT.6)
~ L(t) = µ[ ~ w(t) ¡ ~ ¿L(t)] (AT.7)
~ q(t) = ¾
h
~ I(t) ¡ ~ K(t)
i
(AT.8)
~ Y (t) = "~ L(t) + (1 ¡ ") ~ K(t) (AT.9)
~ T(t) = [(1 ¡ ")¿K + "¿L] ~ Y (t) + (1 ¡ ")(1 ¡ ¿K)~ ¿K(t) + "(1 ¡ ¿L)~ ¿L(t) (AT.10)
~ YF(t) = "(1 ¡ ¿L)[ ~ w(t) ¡ ~ ¿L(t)] + ~ Z(t) (AT.11)
!C ~ C(t) = !X ~ X(t) + µ
h
~ YF(t) ¡ ~ Z(t)
i
(AT.12)
!X ~ X(t) = ((½ + ¸)=r)
h
~ A(t) + ~ H(t)
i
(AT.13)
~ A(t) = !A
h
~ K(t) + ~ q(t)
i
+ ~ B(t) + ~ F(t) (AT.14)
_ ~ B(t) = r
h




!I ´ I=Y , share of ¯rm investment in national income; !X ´ X=Y , share of full consumption
in national income; !A ´ rA=Y = rqK=Y , share of asset income in national income; !C ´
C=Y , share of consumption in national income; !Z ´ Z=Y = T=Y , share of transfers and
tax revenue in national income.
Relationships between initial shares and parameters:
!C = !A+(1¡¿L)", !C = 1¡!I, !C = !X +µ"(1¡¿L)=(1+µ), !A+!I = (1¡")(1¡¿K),
!Z = "¿L + (1 ¡ ")¿K
Notes:
(a) We have used the normalization B = F = 0 initially; (b) ¾ ´ ¡(I=K)(Á00=Á0) ¸ 0; and
(c) ®E ´ ¡fE > 0 and ®K ´ ¡(fK=fE)(K=E) > 0.
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